Adashaliyev Temurbek Ulug‘bek o‘g‘li
Phd researcher at Namangan State Technical University
E-mail: adashaliyevtemurbek98@gmail.com
ORCID: 0009-0006-9342-118X
Abstract. This article theoretically examines the sources of information asymmetry in musharaka and mudaraba contracts and their effects on profit measurement and allocation. Selected studies on information asymmetry and agency theory, international institutional sources and Uzbekistan’s regulatory documents on Islamic financial services are compared. Information problems are classified by project selection, contract implementation, financial result measurement and verification. Differences in the ability to produce information and independently verify it are identified as a principal mechanism affecting the profit base. The scientific contribution lies in explaining the relationship between contractual characteristics, accounting processes and distribution outcomes.
Keywords. musharaka, mudaraba, information asymmetry, profit base, accounting, agency relationships, verifiability.
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